This paper studies the implications of limited information-processing capacity (rational inattention) for optimal consumption and precautionary savings in a permanent income hypotheis (PIH) model with risk-sensitive consumers. Speci…cally, we derive the explicit solution of this model and show that: (1) RI decreases the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of wealth and income, (2) RI raises the amount of precautionary savings, and (3) introducing RI can make the PIH model with risk-sensitive consumers better explain the observed joint dynamics of aggregate consumption and income. We also establish an observational equivalence between the discount factor and the preference for risk-sensitivity in the RI economy, holding constant all other parameters, and show that they have opposing e¤ects on the welfare costs due to incomplete observations caused by RI.
Introduction
Sims (1998) …rst argued that rational inattention (RI) is a plausible method for introducing sluggishness, randomness, and delay into economic models. In his formulation agents have …nite Shannon channel capacity, limiting their ability to process signals about the true state of the world. As a result, an impulse to the economy induces only gradual responses by individuals, as their limited capacity requires many periods to discover just how much the state has moved. Sims (2003) and Luo (2007) use this model to explore anomalies in the consumption literature, particularly the well-known 'excess sensitivity' and 'excess smoothness' puzzles, employing a linear-quadratic version of the standard permanent income model (as in Hall 1978 ). In that model RI is equivalent to confronting the household with a signal extraction problem regarding the value of permanent income (as in Friedman 1954) but permitting the agents to choose the distribution of the noise terms, subject to their limited capacity. 1 With normal innovations to income the optimal distribution of noise is also normal, leading to a simple and analytically tractable problem.
Of course, the linear-quadratic model has some undesirable features as well. In particular, it satis…es the certainty equivalence property, ruling out any response of saving to uncertainty (that is, precautionary behavior). 2 Given that the important component of RI is the introduction of endogenous uncertainty into the household problem, it is not particularly desirable to use a model in which this uncertainty cannot manifest itself in decision rules. Fully nonlinear versions of the RI problem are solved in Sims (2005 Sims ( , 2006 , Lewis (2006) , and Batchuluun, Luo, and Young (2007) ; these papers show that the precautionary aspect of RI is important when channel capacity is small (which it must be to produce any interesting results). But the models solved in those papers have very short horizons due to numerical obstacles -the state of the world is the distribution of perceived states and this distribution is not well-behaved (it is not generally a member of a known class of distributions and tends to have 'holes,' making it di¢ cult to characterize with a small number of parameters). It is important to …nd a class of models that can produce precautionary behavior while maintaining tractability in the RI setup, if the properties of …nite channel capacity are going to be explored.
One class of models that satis…es these desiderata is the risk-sensitive permanent income model from Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999) . 3 In this model agents e¤ectively compute expectations through a distorted lens, where the distortion is caused by aversion to model misspeci…cation (or a desire for robustness). The resulting decision rules depend explicitly on the variance of the shocks, producing precautionary savings. But the endogenous variables are still linear functions of the states, leading again to the optimality of normal noise in the RI model. Thus, we preserve the tractability of the LQ PIH model without being forced to accept certainty equivalence. 4 There is now a large literature that discusses the connections between risk sensitivity, misspeci…cation concerns, and Knightian uncertainty; Hansen and Sargent (2007) provides a useful summary.
Our …rst step in studying this model is to perform a reduction of the state space. Multivariate versions of the RI model require a constraint we term 'no subsidization.' With more than one state variable, agents can allocate their attention di¤erently across these variables and thus reduce their uncertainty at di¤erent rates; RI requires that the uncertainty regarding one variable cannot be increased in order to reduce uncertainty regarding another, as this would permit reductions that exceed the channel capacity. This constraint is highly nonlinear when the dimension is larger than one, even in the LQ model, so multivariate versions of the RI model are not any more tractable than the nonlinear models mentioned above. We show that a PIH model with a general labor income process can be reduced to a model with a unique state variable -permanent income -that has iid innovations, enabling us to study a model with an empirically-reasonable income process within the LQ setup.
We then present the basic risk-sensitive (RS) model and derive some results regarding the behavior of consumption. We show explicitly that precautionary savings is increasing in the parameter that measures risk sensitivity (or the concern for model misspeci…cation) and that the marginal propensity to consume out of permanent income is decreasing. From here we proceed by introducing …nite Shannon channel capacity; RI implies that behavior is as if the agent were observing a noisy signal of next period's true permanent income, so the agent uses the Kalman …lter to update the perceived state. Since the evolution of the true state is a¤ected by precautionary motives, the evolution of the perceived state is as well. Thus, RS and RI 3 Other important contributions to the risk-sensitive literature include Hansen and Sargent (1995) and van der Ploeg (1993). Hansen and Sargent (2004) demonstrate that the risk-sensitive model displays a form of certainty equivalence, but that it generates precautionary savings anyway. 4 Of course, quadratic utility carries with it other objectionable properties, such as increasing relative risk aversion.
interact -while the household uses the same Kalman gain parameter independent of the degree of risk sensitivity, the mean value of the signal received increases with RS, so the perceived state evolves di¤erently.
Our paper is related closely to Kasa (2006) , who derives connections between robust control and rational inattention in a continuous-time setting. That paper focuses mainly on drawing out the observational equivalence properties of model uncertainty aversion and rational inattention, which we also comment on here. Our main focus here is on the joint implications of risk sensitivity and rational inattention -are there questions which would elicit di¤erent responses from agents who are risk-sensitive and those who face information-processing constraints? Because we are able to provide closed-form solutions to the RS-RI-PIH model we can provide two general results. First, introducing RI into the RS-PIH model improves the predictions about the aggregate joint dynamics of consumption and income. Second, we show that observational equivalence holds for quantities -we can …nd more than one combination of discount factors and risk-sensitivity that imply the same savings and consumption behavior, independent of the presence of RI -but that the welfare costs of information-processing constraints are di¤erent.
Thus, agents who are risk-sensitive and relatively impatient would pay more to improve their information-processing capacity than an agent who is not risk-sensitive and relatively patient, even though their observable behavior is identical.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents two PIH models with general income processes and discusses some results regarding optimal consumption-savings decisions and the joint dynamics of aggregate consumption and income (these models are the standard PIH model and the RS-PIH model). Section 3 introduces RI into the RS-PIH model and examines the implications of the interaction between RI and RS for the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth and income, precautionary savings, and the welfare costs of RI. Section 4 proves our observational equivalence result for the RI economy. Section 5 concludes.
Two Permanent Income Models
In this section, we present two benchmark models. In the …rst model, we show that within the LQG framework, the multivariate permanent income model with general income processes can be reduced to the univariate model with iid innovations to permanent income that can be solved in closed-form solution. We then present the second model in which risk-sensitivity is introduced into the univariate PIH model in Section 2.1.
The Standard Permanent Income Model
We …rst present a standard rational expectation (RE) version of the PIH model with a general income process. We then show that it can be reduced to a univariate PIH model with iid innovations to permanent income. Households solve the dynamic consumption-savings problem
subject to
where u(c t ) = 1 2 (c t c) 2 is the period utility function, c > 0 is the bliss point, equation (2.2) is the ‡ow budget constraint, c t is consumption, w t is cash-on-hand (or market resources), y t is a general income process with Gaussian white noise innovations, is the discount factor, R is the constant gross interest rate at which the consumer can borrow and lend freely. 5 This speci…cation follows that in Hall (1978) and Flavin (1981) and implies that optimal consumption is determined by permanent income:
where
is the expected present value of lifetime resources, consisting of …nancial wealth plus human wealth. If s t is de…ned as a new state variable, we can reformulate the above PIH model as
# (2.5) 5 As in Hansen and Sargent (2007) or Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999), we can also interpret this problem as applying to a linear production technology that generates consumption and capital,
where R k is the net physical return on capital and investment is given by it = kt kt 1. If the allocation is decentralized the return coincides with the risk-free interest rate R. subject to
a formal proof is contained in Luo (2007) . The stochastic term t+1 is equal to
that is, t+1 the time (t + 1) innovation to permanent income. v(s 0 ) is the consumer's value function under RE. By de…ning a new state variable s t , the original multivariate optimization problem has been reduced to a univariate problem; under quadratic utility and the assumption R = 1 this model leads to the well-known random walk result of Hall (1978) :
which means that the change in consumption depends neither on the past history of labor income nor on anticipated changes in labor income. We also point out the well-known result that the standard PIH model with quadratic utility implies the certainty equivalence property holds; thus, uncertainty has no impact on optimal consumption, so that there is no precautionary saving in the sense of Kimball (1990) .
Furthermore, let k t = w t c t denote end of period …nancial wealth.
is a measure of saving (or investment). Substituting this expression into (2.2) and using (2.6) and (2.8) we obtain k t+1 = 0; thus, there is no wealth accumulation in response to permanent changes in income, as all such changes are allocated to consumption.
For simplicity, following Pischke (1995), we suppose that income y t can be expressed as the sum of aggregate permanent and idiosyncratic transitory components:
where the superscripts p and t denote permanent and transitory, respectively. Each of these components follows its own stochastic process; y p t+1 follows a random walk: 10) and y t t+1 follows an iid process:
where " t+1 and t+1 are white noises with mean 0 and variance ! 2 " and ! 2 ; respectively. Substituting these income processes into (2.8) gives
The di¤erent load factors on the two shocks re ‡ects the standard consumption-smoothing motives: consume all of a permanent increase in income (" t+1 ) but only the annuity value of a transitory one ( t+1 ).
Suppose that there are a continuum of consumers in the model economy. Given the expression of the change in individual consumption, (2.12), aggregating across all consumers yields the change in aggregate consumption as
so that aggregate consumption C t+1 is unpredictable using past information and the smoothness ratio of aggregate consumption to income is 1. 6 In other words, the predictions of the standard PIH model for the joint behavior of aggregate consumption and income contradicts the empirical evidence; in the US data aggregate consumption growth is much smoother than income and is sensitive to past information. 7 These two anomalies have been termed the excess smoothness and excess sensitivity puzzles in the literature. 8 Furthermore, as documented in Reis (2006) , the impulse response of aggregate consumption to aggregate income takes a hump-shaped form, which means that aggregate consumption reacts to income shocks gradually. Therefore, the standard RE PIH model cannot capture this feature in the US data.
The Risk-sensitive Permanent Income Model
Risk-sensitivity (RS) was …rst introduced into the LQ-Gaussian framework by Jacobson (1973) and extended by Whittle (1981 Whittle ( ,1990 . Exploiting the recursive utility framework of Epstein and 6 The idiosyncratic shock, , would be cancelled out after aggregating over all consumers. 7 In the US data, the smoothness ratio is around 0:5. 
subject to (2.6). We restrict the domain of consumption to points with c t < c so that the period utility function is increasing and concave. The distorted expectation operator R t is de…ned by
where > 0 measures higher risk aversion vis a vis the von Neumann-Morgenstern speci…cation.
Setting R = 1 for simplicity, solving this optimization problem gives the following consumption function:
This consumption function clearly shows that the preference for risk-sensitivity, , a¤ects both the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of perceived permanent income,
the precautionary savings increment, 9 The stronger the preference for risk sensitivity, 9 Given the de…nition of st in (2.6), the MPC out of permanent income equals the MPC out of …nancial wealth wt and human wealth
the larger the MPC and the larger the precautionary saving increment, since
As its name suggests, risk sensitivity makes agents more concerned about outcomes that are unfavorable; one way to minimize the probability of bad outcomes (here, outcomes where the marginal utility of consumption becomes very large) is to save a bit more, reducing consumption relative to the certainty equivalent setup where = 0. The law of motion for s t shows this precautionary savings clearly -s t+1 is an increasing function of , conditional on s t .
We now present some basic results from the RS model, mainly to facilitate comparisons to the RI model of the next section. The change in consumption can be written as
Equation (2.17) has three important implications. First, with RS consumption growth depends on past consumption, whereas with = 0 consumption growth does not depend on c t ; second, RS increases the sensitivity of consumption growth to unanticipated changes in permanent income,
and third, RS increases the volatility of consumption relative to income. Note also that the sign of the coe¢ cient on t+1 depends on ; if households are su¢ ciently risk-sensitive consumption growth will fall when permanent income rises.
As in the last subsection, substituting the speci…ed income processes, (2.9), (2.10), and (2.11), into (2.17) gives
Furthermore, wealth accumulation ( k) is given by
thus, risk-sensitive consumers adjust their optimal plan to changes in income by consuming only a fraction of the increase in income. Assets are reduced when shocks to income are negative and increased when they are positive.
Aggregating (2.18) across all consumers gives the change in aggregate consumption:
(2.20) Figure 1 illustrates the response of aggregate consumption growth to an aggregate income shock " t+1 ; RS raises the sensitivity of consumption growth to unanticipated changes in aggregate income. Furthermore, the smoothness ratio of aggregate consumption to income is seen to be
where "sd"denotes standard deviation. It is straightforward to prove the following proposition.
Proof. Clearly the …rst term is increasing in . Then
Thus, is increasing in .
RS increases the response of consumption growth to a change in income. Thus, RS by itself worsens the standard RE PIH model's prediction for the joint behavior of aggregate consumption and income growth by exacerbating the "excess smoothness" puzzle, and therefore needs to be combined with other assumptions to resolve the anomalies. 10 
The Permanent Income Model with Rational Inattention
We now introduce rational inattention (RI) by assuming the consumer faces information processing constraints; as …rst suggested in Sims (1998) , households have only …nite Shannon channel capacity that they can apply to observations of the state of the world. As in Sims (2003), we use the concept of entropy from information theory to characterize the rate of information ‡ow; the reduction in entropy is a natural measure of information ‡ow, where entropy is de…ned as a measure of the uncertainty about a random variable. 11 With …nite channel capacity, the consumer will choose a signal that reduces the uncertainty of the state variable subject to limitations on the extent that entropy can be reduced. Formally, this idea is described by the information processing constraint
where is the consumer's channel capacity that imposes an upper bound on the amount of information that can be transmitted via the channel, H (s t+1 jI t ) denotes the entropy of the state prior to observing the new signal at t + 1, and H (s t+1 jI t+1 ) denotes the entropy after observing the new signal. 12 Given the LQG speci…cation, Sims (2003 Sims ( , 2005 showed that
are the conditional mean and variance of the state variable s t , respectively. In models with imperfect observations, the optimal decisions are determined by the perceived state, rather than the actual state. Computational di¢ culties arise in RI models because the perceived state is the distribution of the actual state variable conditional on the information set available at time t, I t , and as we have noted already this object typically has high dimension. Fortunately, given the LQG speci…cation and the Gaussian distribution of s t , the …rst two moments, b s t and 2 t , are enough to characterize the perceived state. In addition, as we will show, the problem will simplify further because 2 t converges to a constant in the stochastic steady state.
The constraint (3.1) can be rewritten as
variance of the state variable, s t+1 , respectively. 13 As shown in Sims (2003) , in any univariate case, this information constraint completes the characterization of the optimization problem with RI and the model can be solved explicitly. Furthermore, with a …nite capacity the optimizing consumer will choose a signal that reduces the conditional variance of s t+1 by a limited amount.
Hence, (3.2) must be binding for the optimizing consumer:
It is straightforward to show that in the univariate case (3.3) has a steady state 2 . In that
, and the consumer behaves as if he is observing a noisy signal, s t+1 = s t+1 + t+1 , where t+1 is the iid endogenous noise and its variance,
, is determined by the usual updating formula of the variance of a Gaussian distribution:
Thus, in the steady state we have
For simplicity, we assume that initially the model economy is at the steady state, implying
To draw attention to the value of reducing the multivariate PIH model to a univariate one we note that RI with multiple state variables requires a second constraint:
and thus is not linear except in the univariate case where it is trivial. 14 As a result, the multivariate version of the RI PIH model does not preserve the optimality of Gaussian noise; we therefore exploit the state reduction presented above and use permanent income as the unique state variable.
RI with RS Model
Luo (2007) studies the case of RI without risk-sensitivity, so we proceed directly to the RI with RS model. In the presence of RI, the household problem is characterized by the following Bellman equation:
subject to the budget constraint, (2.6), and the Kalman …lter equation
The distorted expectation operator is now given by
is the perceived state variable, is the optimal weight on the new observation of the state, and t+1 is the endogenous noise. Note: there is a monotone relationship between and so we can parameterize RI using directly, as the optimal choice of is given by
note also that
so that we nest the standard RS speci…cation as a special case of our model. To make economic sense in subsequent results we impose the condition >
R , which implies that agents must be able to process some minimum amount of information. This condition is similar to one imposed in Luo and Young (2007) that guarantees an agent with higher capacity opti-mally chooses a noise process with lower variance; we regard this requirement to be intuitively reasonable.
The following proposition summarizes the main results of the above RS-RI PIH model under the restriction R = 1. Proposition 1. Given …nite channel capacity and the degree of risk-sensitivity , the value function of a risk-sensitive consumer under RI is
the consumption function is
actual permanent income evolves according to
and perceived permanent income evolves according to
Proof. See Appendix 6.3 for the proof.
Note that the structural shock and the noise shock have the same e¤ect on b s t+1 but only the structural shock a¤ects s t+1 . The consumption function shows that a¤ects both the MPC out of the perceived state variable R 1 R ! 2 and the precautionary savings increment ! 2 c R ! 2 only through the variance of the noise distribution. Given the expression for ! 2 in the proposition, we note now that
Thus, with …nite capacity it must be that ! 2 > ! 2 and ! 2 is decreasing in .
Proof. By simple calculation we obtain
Thus, both the MPC out of the perceived state variable (the responsiveness of c t to b s t ) and the precautionary savings increment (the intercept of the consumption pro…le) are decreasing in for …xed , meaning that agents with lower capacity save a larger fraction of any income increase. Figure 2 illustrates how the combination of ( ; ) a¤ects the MPC out of …nancial and human wealth (which are equal here) when R = 1:01.
Since agents with low capacity are very concerned about the con ‡uence of low permanent income and high consumption (meaning they believe their permanent income is high so they consume a lot and then their new signal indicates that in fact their permanent income was low), they take actions which reduce the probability of this bad event -they save more. 15 The strength of the precautionary e¤ect is positively related to the amount of uncertainty regarding the true level of permanent income, and this uncertainty increases as gets smaller. Figure 3 illustrates the e¤ect of ( ; ) on the precautionary savings increment. In the absence of risk sensitivity ( = 0) the precautionary savings increment is zero independent of ; if > 0, however, precautionary savings is decreasing in , so that agents with lower capacity will consume less on average. 16 1 5 A more complete discussion of precautionary savings in an RI model can be found in Batchuluun, Luo, and Young (2007). 1 6 Precautionary savings in this model is di¤erent from the precautionary savings that arises when there is an interaction between exogenous income risk and convex marginal utility. Precautionary savings arises here because RI agents cannot use all available information to make decision, so it does not require convexity of the marginal utility function.
The change in consumption in the RI-RS economy can be written as
so that
; (3.14)
Wealth accumulation under RI is
under RI the savings of risk-sensitive consumers also responds to unperceived changes in the true state relative to the perceived one. Figure 4 plots the responses of consumption to the aggregate permanent income shock " t .
It clearly shows that RI has a similar qualitative e¤ect on consumption in the standard RE model and the RS model; 17 quantitatively, RI has larger impacts on consumption in the RS model because the deviation of the asymptote from that for the standard RE case is larger in this case. With a stronger preference for risk-sensitivity, the precautionary savings increment is larger and thus an income shock that is initially undetected would have larger impacts on consumption during the adjustment process. In addition, we note that the immediate response of consumption to a shock to permanent income is given by
This expression is increasing in , implying that the more risk-sensitive the household the more consumption responds initially to changes in permanent income. It is also increasing in , implying that agents with lower capacity have smaller initial responses, so that RI and RS have opposing e¤ects. In Figure 5 we plot the short-run responses of consumption growth as a function of for various values of .
With RI agents respond slowly, similar to their response if they faced convex adjustment costs for their wealth; one resulting implication is that the short-run and long-run responses of consumption are di¤erent. The long-run response is given by
Note that when = 0 and 1 = 1 and taking the limit as T ! 1 this expression reduces to the result reported in Luo (2007):
It is clear from the above two expressions that RS has two opposite impacts on the long-run responses of consumption to income shocks under RI. First, increases the long-run response by a factor R R ! 2 ; second, it reduces the long-run response by a factor
Furthermore, the volatility of the growth of individual consumption can be written as
which is increasing in and .
Aggregate Dynamics
Since the expression for the change in individual consumption (3.14) permits exact aggregation,
we can obtain the change in aggregate consumption as
; ;
where i denotes a particular individual and E i ( ) is the population average. This expression shows that even if every consumer only faces the common shock ", the RI economy still has heterogeneity since each consumer faces the idiosyncratic noise induced by …nite channel capacity.
As argued in Sims (2003) , although the randomness in an individual's response to aggregate shocks will be idiosyncratic because it arises from the individual's information-processing constraint, there is likely a signi…cant common component; provided that agents face similar needs for coding macroeconomic information, they will rely on common sources and generate aggregate noise shocks. Existing theory does not provide a way to determine the common component of the noise term; we can only state that the common term E i i t is between 0 and the part of the idiosyncratic error t generated by the aggregate income shock " t .
In order to simplify expressions we consider the case where all noises are idiosyncratic (so that individuals live on isolated islands and do not interact with each other directly or indirectly via conversation, imitation, newspapers, or other media); in this special case the change in aggregate consumption can be written as
Therefore, the volatility of aggregate consumption relative to income can be written as
which means that RI reduces the volatility of aggregate consumption growth in the risk-sensitive PIH model. Figure 5 illustrates how the combination of RI and RS a¤ects the smoothness ratio of aggregate consumption. It is clear that incorporating RI into the risk-sensitive PIH model can reduce the volatility of aggregate consumption and thus make the model better explain the data in this aspect. For example, when = 5 10 6 , ! " = 5:6, R = 1:01, and = 0:15, the excess smoothness ratio is about 0:47, very close to its empirical counterpart in the US data.
Welfare Costs From RI
We present here the welfare cost of RI -what an agent would pay to increase to 1 (so that the optimal choice is = 1). This calculation is de…ned as the di¤erence between the value function with and without information-processing constraints. Luo (2007) shows that the welfare costs of RI are fairly small in the certainty equivalent environment; our interest here is assessing how these costs depend on . 18 Welfare costs should be increasing in , since the precautionary motive for savings is stronger and agents are more sensitive to variance; both of these e¤ects reduce lifetime utility, the …rst by reducing mean consumption (although also reducing the variance of consumption, this e¤ect cannot be large enough to improve utility) and the second by leaving the agent more averse to the remaining consumption variance.
Following Cochrane (1989) , Pischke (1995) , and others, we use a money metric to measure the welfare cost of deviating from the standard RS solution. Speci…cally, dividing the expected
by the marginal utility of a dollar at time t and converting it to dollars per quarter yields $ Loss/quarter:
1 8 Tallarini (2000) shows how risk-sensitivity dramatically increases the welfare cost of business cycles.
! 2 = ! 2 , and = 1 (1 )R 2 . If = 0 this expression collapses to
which is positively related to both the variance of the perceived state relative to the actual state and the additional volatility induced by RI.
To do welfare analysis in this RS-RI model, we need to know the level of E [s t ] (note that it is equal to E [b s t ]): First, denote by the local coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, which equals
for the utility function u ( ) evaluated at mean income, E [y]. To calculate the welfare losses due to RI, we set the parameters according to those estimated from post-World War U.S. time series by Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999) for a PIH model with two-factor endowment process.
Speci…cally, we follow the procedure used in Hansen and Sargent (2004) and use the estimated one-factor endowment process as follows y t+1 = 0:9992y t + " t+1 ; (3.24) and " t+1 follows an iid process distributed as N (0; 5:6). Since the estimated persistence coe¢ cient is di¢ cult to distinguish from 1, for simplicity we assume that income follows a random walk. Following Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999) we also set the mean income level Table 1 summarizes the welfare costs of RI measured as a percentage of the mean level of income, y = E [y t ] ; in the RS-PIH model when R = 1:01 and = 1=R = 0:9901; RS signi…cantly increases the welfare costs of information-processing constraints. Furthermore, when R increases to 1:015 and falls to 0:9852, the change of the welfare costs due to RI depends on . Table   2 shows how the changes in R a¤ects the welfare costs due to RI when R = 1. 20 It shows that when is low enough (an extreme case is that = 0), the welfare cost increases with R because in this case the higher the interest rate, the higher the conversion rate R 1 R and the larger the dollar loss ; and if is larger, would induce much larger welfare losses from RI,
, which means that an increase in R has larger impact on the reduction in the welfare loss.
Therefore, when the value of is large enough, the negative impact of R on would be larger than the positive impact of R on the convertion rate, R 1 R , in absolute value; consequently, the dollar loss per quarter will decrease with R:
An Observational Equivalence Result
Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999) show that as far as the quantity observations on consumption and investment are concerned, the risk-sensitive version ( > 0; e ) of the PIH model is observationally equivalent to the standard version ( = 0; ) of the PIH model for a unique pair of discount factors. 21 However, the two models have di¤erent implications for asset prices.
In this subsection, we show that holding all parameters constant except the pair of ( ; ), the RI version of the PIH model with risk-sensitive consumers ( > 0 and R = 1) is observationally equivalent to the standard RI version of the model ( = 0 and R > 1), extending the observational equivalence result to a broader class of models. We then show that the resulting welfare costs of RI depend critically on the particular ( ; ) pair chosen; in principle one could then design an experiment that would permit identi…cation of risk-sensitivity and discount rates separately.
For the case R > 1 we show in Appendix (6.1) the consumption function under RI can be written as
comparing it with the risk-sensitive consumption function under RI, (3.9), we have the following observational equivalence result. Proposition 1. Let the parameters ( ; ) satisfy the condition
Then consumption and savings are identical.
Given this result we can express as a function e ( ) of and other …xed parameters
or express as a function e ( ) of and other …xed parameters
it is immediate that @ e @ > 0 and @ e @! 2 > 0. Figure 6 illustrates the observational equivalence between and when R = 1:01. An increase in the discount factor means that saving is more attractive, which is equivalent to increasing the parameter for risk-sensitivity (for quantities). Therefore, if we vary and according to (4.3) , the consumption function and consumption growth under RI remain unchanged. 22 Furthermore, the degree of attention also a¤ects the observational equivalence (OE) result; Figure 7 shows that the lower the value of , the greater the value of ! 2 , which means that for any given level of a higher is required to make the OE hold. That is, the smaller a consumer's information-processing capacity is, the more patient they need to be to produce the same consumption-saving behavior as an agent with a higher channel capacity, holding …xed their attitude towards risk.
Although varying and according to (4.3) has the same impact on consumption and savings decisions, it has opposing e¤ects on the welfare losses due to RI. Using the value function under RI in the case of R > 1 and = 0, the expression of the welfare losses can be written as
where = 1 (1 )R 2 . The utility losses in this case are given by $ Loss/quarter: Table 3 summarizes the main results in the two cases when the interest rate R = 1:01. The table clearly shows that: (1) in an RI economy, risk-sensitive consumers ( > 0 and R = 1) face larger welfare losses due to …nite information-processing capacity than do observationally-equivalent consumers with = 0 and > 1=R; and (2) increasing the value of reduces the welfare losses due to RI while the increasing increases the welfare losses. That is, the welfare costs of rational inattention are not constant within the class of observationally-equivalent preferences.
Consider two households within the class of observationally-equivalent preferences; for convenience, assume = 0 for one household (who therefore has a relatively high ) and one with > 0. The two households have the same consumption-savings behavior so RI must alter the process for consumption identically; in other words, the consumption ‡uctuations induced by the inability of the household to process information completely are the same across the di¤erent households. The di¤erence is that the second household (the impatient one) is more sensitive to the residual ‡uctuations in consumption generated by incomplete observations, producing a greater willingness to pay for improved processing capacity. Thus, one could in principle design an experiment that identi…es both discounting and risk sensitivity in the LQ world by asking how much agents would pay to get better observations about their permanent income.
It is obvious that the interest rate R will also a¤ect the utility losses due to RI measured by the ratio of $/quarter to mean income y. Speci…cally, R a¤ects the utility losses via two channels: First, it a¤ects the conversion rate R 1 R ; second, R also a¤ects the expected welfare loss, E [ v]. Table 4 shows that holding other parameters constant, the higher the interest rate, the greater the utility losses due to RI in both the case of R > 1 and = 0 and the case of R = 1 and > 0.
Conclusion
This paper provides a characterization of the consumption-savings behavior of a single agent who is both risk-sensitive and limited in their capacity to process signals. The key component to our model is the presence of precautionary savings, permitting the limited processing capacity to af-fect the average level of consumption. We show that there still exists an observational equivalence between models with and without risk-sensitivity even when agents face information-processing constraints, extending the results of Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999) to a broader class of models. However, within the observationally-equivalent class of models the welfare costs of rational inattention are not constant -models with higher discount factors and correspondingly lower risk-sensitivity generate larger welfare costs of RI than observationally-equivalent ones with lower discount factors and higher risk-sensitivity.
While our model does permit precautionary savings, it is not as general as we would prefer.
As we have noted above, solving fully-nonlinear versions of the RI model is extremely di¢ cult given the shape of the optimal distribution of consumption, meaning that only models with short horizons can be considered. We suspect that methods to deal with this problem can be developed, particularly for simple one-agent problems like the one studied here. A more di¢ cult problem with RI models is noted in Sims (2005) -a general equilibrium setting will involve nonstandard features including inventories, retailing, and probably search. We believe that such advances are needed to fully integrate RI into economic models and develop the full potential of rational inattention. 
subject to the budget constraint, (2.6), and the Kalman …lter equation, (3.6), yields Bb s t+1 C :
Second, performing the indicated optimization yields the following …rst-order condition
Substituting Equations (2.6), (3.6), and (6.4), into Equation (6.2) gives Ab s
Third, collecting and matching terms, the constant coe¢ cients turn out to be
Substituting (6.5) and (6.6) into (6.4) yields the consumption function, (4.1) in the text. 
Thus, the recursive operator can be written as
Maximizing the RHS of (2.14) with respect to c t yields the …rst-order condition
and
we use the fact that R = 1 to simplify the expressions.
Substituting (6.13) and (6.8) into (2.14) gives
Collecting terms, the undetermined coe¢ cients turn out to be 25
(6.14)
(6.16) Substituting (6.14) and (6.15) into (6.13) yields the consumption function, (2.16), in the text.
Combining (2.16) with (2.6) yields the evolution of permanent income:
Note that
and the change in consumption:
6.3. Solving the Standard Risk-sensitive PIH model with RI
As before, we conjecture that
Bb s t C; where A; B; and C are undetermined coe¢ cients. We …rst evaluate
Maximizing the RHS of (3.5) with respect to c t yields the …rst-order condition Collecting terms, the undetermined coe¢ cients turn out to be Note. The parameters are set as follows: c = 32; y = 16; R = 1:01; and ! " = 0:2559: 
